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 The Role of Financial Institutions in the Corporate Governance of 
Listed Chinese Companies 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the role of Chinese financial institutions in corporate governance 
of listed companies through interviews with both senior managers of financial 
institutions and directors of listed companies. Our results show that while most 
securities companies are passive investors, a good proportion of the active mutual 
funds help their portfolio companies prepare financial forecasts, standardise their 
operations, raise external funds and strengthen their company image in the capital 
markets. This limited role can be attributed to a number of factors specific to the 
Chinese context including highly concentrated state ownership, an immature 
regulatory environment, inadequate transparency and disclosure of financial 
information, and weak corporate governance within financial institutions themselves. 
It could also be affected by several other factors that are considered to cause 
institutional passivity in developed countries such as conflict of interest, monitoring 
costs, and lack of expertise.  
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1.  Introduction  
Substantial regulatory effort has recently been made in China to accord 
financial institutions an important role in improving corporate governance and 
stabilising the stock market. For example, in 2000, the government made a strategic 
decision to devote major efforts to developing financial institutions (China Securities 
Regulatory Commission,  2000). It encouraged financial institutions, especially mutual 
funds and securities companies, to invest in listed companies so that they can monitor 
corporate management and counter opportunistic behaviors of individual investors. In 
this context, mutual funds and securities companies have experienced an 
unprecedented growth.  
     Recent legal and finance literature highlights that a central agency problem in 
a setting like China with poor corporate governance and weak investor protection is 
the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders (e.g., La Porta 
et al., 2000; Sun and Tong, 2003; Bai et al., 2004; Wei et al., 2005). Indeed, Xiao et al 
(2004) report that there are widespread corporate malpractices in China (e.g., illegal 
insider trading, market manipulation, and corporate reporting frauds) that are 
detrimental to minority shareholders. Acting as an intermediary in pooling the 
investment of various individuals, mutual funds can help strengthen the bargaining 
power of minority shareholders in the corporate governance process of their investee 
companies (Belev, 2003). This helps explain why regulators in China are keen to 
develop the role of financial institutions - particularly, mutual funds - in improving 
corporate governance and stabilising stock markets.  
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 The role of financial institutions in China so far has attracted little academic 
attention, partly because financial institutions are not perceived to play any significant 
role in corporate governance (Gen, 2002). However, the literature offers no empirical 
evidence to support such a perception. Indeed, financial institutions’ recent attempts 
to intervene in corporate governance issues suggest that some of them are exercising 
an important role in protecting the rights of minority shareholders. Thus, it is 
important to empirically reassess their current role in corporate governance in China 
and the effectiveness of the recent regulatory effort. This study represents a first 
attempt towards filling a gap in the literature. If empirical evidence suggests that 
financial institutions play a certain role in corporate governance, then this would be an 
indication that the regulatory efforts have achieved some measure of success and such 
efforts should probably be extended. If the evidence confirms prior perceptions that 
financial institutions play little or no role in corporate governance, then it would be 
useful to identify the reasons why this is the case and ways to overcome the 
difficulties.   
    To explore the role of financial institutions in the governance of listed Chinese 
companies, we interviewed both senior managers of financial institutions and 
directors of listed companies. From their perspectives, we are able to provide 
balanced and/or comprehensive evidence on the participation and role of financial 
institutions in corporate governance. The interview evidence indicates that most 
securities companies are passive investors, while some active mutual funds attempt to 
get involved in the governance of their portfolio firms. This finding suggests that the 
regulatory efforts in promoting the development of mutual funds seem to have 
generated positive, albeit limited, impacts on corporate governance. This paper also 
indicates that this limited role can be attributed to a number of factors. Some of the 
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factors are consistent with the arguments put forward by studies undertaken in other 
economies. These include conflicts of interest with investee companies, high 
monitoring costs, and lack of expertise. Others appear to be specific to the Chinese 
context, for example, high concentration of state ownership, immature regulatory 
environment, inadequate disclosure of financial information, and weak corporate 
governance within financial institutions themselves.  
     The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. An overview of the 
Chinese institutional background is provided in Section 2. A review of related 
literature on the competing views about the role of corporate governance is presented 
in Section 3. The research questions are discussed in Section 4. A description of the 
research method and the sample used is presented in Section 5. The interview data are 
analysed in Section 6. Finally, the conclusions and policy recommendations are 
presented in Section 7.  
 
2. Institutional background in China 
2.1 Corporate governance in listed Chinese companies 
The current legal framework of corporate governance in listed Chinese 
companies is mainly based upon the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
as well as dozens of regulations issued by various regulatory authorities.1 Under this 
framework, there are three general levels of authority that govern a company. The 
shareholders’ general meetings operate as the company’s ultimate power function. 
The second level of authority consists of the board of directors and the supervisory 
                                                 
1 These regulations include “Suspending and Terminating the Listing of Loss-making Listed 
Companies Implementing Procedures (2001),” “Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to 
the Board of Directors (2001),” “Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China 
(2002),” and “Notice of the Pilot Projects of Reform of the Segmented Share Structure (2005).” 
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board, both appointed by, and report to, shareholders.  The supervisory board is 
responsible for supervising directors and senior officers. To protect small 
shareholders’ interests, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) requires 
that one third of all board members are “independent” in the sense that they are not 
related to the listed company or its controlling shareholders. The third level of 
authority consists of managers, who are responsible for daily operations. This 
framework is meant to protect shareholders’ interests. However in practice, this 
purpose has not yet been fully achieved (Xiao et al., 2004). 
In China, since most listed companies have been transformed from former 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), there is a high proportion of state ownership and 
legal person ownership (i.e., shares held by institutional promoters and other legal 
persons, most of which are also state-owned or controlled through SOEs or other 
state-owned institutions) and a great degree of ownership concentration (Xiao et al., 
2004). Data from 20032 indicate that state shares and legal person shares accounted 
for over 64 percent of total share ownership in listed firms. By law, these shares are 
not publicly tradable although they could be exchanged by agreement approved by the 
government, thus leaving only about one-third of shares publicly tradable. Moreover, 
the largest three shareholders held, on average, about 48 percent of total shares, of 
which the average shareholding by the largest shareholders is about 42 per cent. The 
high proportion of state ownership, the concentrated ownership, and the segmented 
share structure have some important implications for corporate governance. First, 
under the concentrated ownership structure, the agency problem mainly becomes the 
conflict between controlling owners and minority shareholders (Claessens and Fan, 
2002). This structure in reality often leads to insider control. Second, because of the 
                                                 
2  According to the Sinofin database compiled by Peking University in China. 
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low percentage of tradable shares, and a severe segregation of the stock market, a 
hostile takeover is nearly impossible. As room for operations in the mergers and 
acquisitions market is severely limited, the efficiency and the quality of this market 
cannot be achieved. Third, the high proportion of state ownership provides the basis 
through which the government may exercise control of the corporate sector to pursue 
social and political objectives (Xu and Wang, 1999).   
     Consequently, Chinese boards of directors have relatively little decision-
making power compared to government ministries, commissions and securities 
regulatory authorities. Most supervisory boards are more “decorative” than functional; 
they either do nothing or merely provide advice (Tenev et al., 2002; Xiao et al., 2004). 
This governance structure facilitates immoral and opportunist behaviours aimed at 
pursuing private gains rather than the best interests of the company. Typical 
“behaviours” include collusion between managers and workers; channelling a 
company’s profit and assets through unfair related party transactions; engaging in 
self-dealing in pursuit of private gains; earnings management for meeting share listing 
requirements; manipulating initial public offering (IPO) and secondary market prices; 
and trading on insider information (Lee and Hahn, 2001; Qian, 1995). Corporate 
scandals such as “Yin Guang Xia”3 greatly damaged investor confidence and suggest 
that corporate governance is very weak in listed Chinese companies. In response to 
these problems, the Chinese regulators have encouraged the development of financial 
institutions (especially mutual funds) in the hope that they can help improve corporate 
governance.    
                                                 
3 In July 2001, a blue-chip high-tech company called “Yin Guang Xia” was found to have forged 
customs ’ receipts and made up profit figures in order to support its extremely high and rising stock 
price. Since then, some other blue chip companies were also found to have falsified accounts  and 
disclosed misleading financial information.  
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2.2  Securities companies and mutual funds in China  
Chinese financial institutions include commercial banks, securities companies, 
mutual funds, trust and investment companies, insurance companies, pension funds 
and privately placed funds (Kim et al., 2003). This paper focuses on mutual funds and 
securities companies for two reasons. First, because of the legal restrictions by the 
Commercial Bank Law (1995, Article 43), banks do not play any significant 
ownership role in the governance of listed companies as they are forbidden to hold 
company shares directly and actively. 4 Second, insurance companies were not allowed 
to invest in the stock market until the end of 2004 and are still subject to a strict 
investment-quota control over the amount of funds that they can invest in listed stocks. 
Therefore, they are unlikely to have played any significant ownership role in 
corporate governance in China. 
    As of December 2003, 133 securities companies were operating in China. 
According to the  Securities Law of 1998 (Article 6), securities companies must be 
established separately from banks, trust companies and insurance companies. Before 
2000, securities companies experienced a glorious development (Zhu et al., 2002). 
After that, their operating environment deteriorated with a sharp drop in the turnover 
and in the funds raised from stock markets. For example, in 2003, 122 of 133 
securities companies reported a total loss of more than 900 million yuan (US$ 109 
million) (China Daily, 4th February 2004).  
 Mutual funds have a short history in China, and hence represent an immature, 
though emerging, sector. The regulations limit a mutual fund to investing no more 
than 10 per cent of its total funds in one listed company, and its holdings of that 
                                                 
4  However, banks may occasionally and passively become shareholders of listed companies when 
such shareholdings are used as collateral for bank loans and the borrowing firm cannot meet its 
liabilities.  
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company should not exceed 10 per cent of that company’s total shares. Since 
September 2001, when the first open-end fund was introduced (China Economic 
Times, 20th August 2002), this industry has experienced a rapid growth. By the end of 
2003, 54 closed-end and 41 open-end mutual funds had been established. The net 
assets of mutual funds accounted for nearly 25 per cent, and the assets invested in 
shares made up 13 per cent, of the total tradable share market capitalisation in the two 
domestic stock exchanges by the end of 2004 (Securities Daily, 4th January 2005).  
 
3. Two competing views on the role of financial institutions in 
corporate governance 
3.1  Active monitors 
    Proponents of active institutional monitoring (e.g., Mackenzie, 1993; Monks 
and Minow, 1991) consider that financial institutions should become actively involved 
to resolve the incentive and control problems that characterise large, diffusely held 
corporations, and compel incumbent managers to improve the firm’s operation.      
     Black (1992) and Pound (1992) view active institutional monitoring as a 
natural reaction to the decline in the efficacy of corporate takeovers to discipline 
managers. As the size and concentration of the average institutional shareholdings 
increases, it becomes difficult to sell off large blocks of shares. An attempt to offload 
large blocks of shares in a single firm adversely affects its stock price. As such, the 
selling institution is confronted with an even greater loss in the value of its holdings. 
Therefore, financial institutions would seek to protect their stakes through intervening 
in the governance of investee firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Watts, 1988). 
Meanwhile, being financial intermediaries entails the fiduciary duty that obligates 
them to monitor their holdings closely and to take action to protect investments 
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against erosion in value (Krikorian, 1991; Schneider, 2000).  
 In addition, it is claimed that financial institutions have the power to monitor 
corporate management. Stiglitz (1985) argues that individual shareholders with 
relatively small positions have little incentive to bear the relatively fixed costs of 
collecting information to enable them to monitor and control the behaviour of the 
board. In contrast, financial institutions have informational advantage over individual 
shareholders, and they have  the necessary economic capacity to hire internal and 
external financial analysts to gather and digest information to enable them to take 
more informed decisions. Furthermore, financial institutions gain explicit and implicit 
power from the voting rights of their ownership stakes (Easterbrook and Fischel, 
1983). They can select or dismiss the board of directors by voting for or against board 
members during the annual shareholder meetings. Meanwhile, a strong showing of 
votes that are unfavourable  to management can increase the threat of takeover. In line 
with this reasoning, it is found that institutional owners that commit to holding a 
firm’s equity have increased credibility and influence in monitoring management 
(Ayres and Cramton, 1993). 
The large percentage of institutional shareholdings and the fiduciary duty 
encourage financial institutions to be active monitors. This vigilant institutional 
monitoring may enhance managerial efficiency and the quality of corporate decision-
making. Furthermore, the involvement of financial institutions in a company may lead 
to improved corporate governance structures such as procedural reforms, and 
increased and quicker information disclosure (Pozen, 1994). Moreover, Lang et al. 
(1989) and Servaes (1991) provide evidence that financial institutions direct scarce 
capital to its most efficient use. 
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On the other hand, there is a need for institutional participation in corporate 
issues. Companies with poor financial or stock price performance, or companies with 
poor governance, are usually selected as targets of shareholder activism (Romano, 
2001; Choi and Cho, 2003). Poor performance has created a need for top managers to 
justify their performance to investors and analysts (Bromiley, 1991). In fact, when 
faced with pressure from external sources, top managers seek to comply in a way that 
safeguards their own autonomy (Edelman, 1992). The intervention of financial 
institutions can buffer them from external scrutiny, and enable top managers to signal 
commitment to investor rights (Rao and Sivakumar, 1999). 
 Several instances of active institutions’ efforts to influence firm policy and 
monitor corporate performance have been reported in the popular press. For example, 
institutional owners of the Honeywell Corporation and Lockheed Corporation used 
the proxy voting mechanism to oppose management attempts to block a takeover 
(Wallace, 1998). With a similar motive, California Public Employees Retirement 
System (CalPERS) widely publicises an annual “hit list” of under-performing firms 
(Smith, 1996). However, practical constraints may make institutional monitoring 
ineffective. Bhide (1993) argues that closer access to management may designate 
institutional owners as “inside investors” and jeopardise the liquidity of their stock 
holdings. Taylor (1990) and Wohlstetter (1993) claim that financial institutions do not 
possess the technical expertise to improve on managers’ decisions. Furthermore, 
Black (1990) and Admati et al. (1994) recognise that free-riding among several 
institutional owners may also deter the capacity for collective action against managers.  
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3.2  Passive investors  
 In contrast to active monitoring, financial institutions may choose to be 
passive because they are more likely to sell their holdings in poorly performing 
companies than to expend their resources in monitoring and improving the 
performance of their investees. 
 Several factors, such as myopic goals, conflicts of interest, cost and benefit 
analysis, and different role expectations may motivate institutions to behave like 
passive and transient investors disinterested in overseeing management. Graves (1988) 
argues that fund managers cannot afford to take a long term view in their investment 
decisions since they are reviewed and rewarded on the basis of quarterly, or at most, 
annual performance measures. Drucker (1986) points out that defined benefit pension 
plans are often compelled by employers to liquidate the plan’s stock holdings and 
realise short term gains. Since retiring employees receive fixed annual payments, 
short term gains reduce the employer ’s annual contribution to the plan. David and 
Kochhar (1996) argue that business relationships with firms for some financial 
institutions can act as barriers to effective corporate governance by changing the 
proclivity towards intervention. Pozen (1994) claims that financial institutions are 
generally passive shareholders, only becoming active when expected benefits exceed 
the costs incurred. Webb et al. (2003) attribute the low degree of active participation 
in the UK to such factors as shareholders being not large enough to be concerned 
about monitoring overall performance, and prohibitive transaction costs involved in 
monitoring.  
 In addition, different role expectations from a myriad of stakeholder groups 
would lead to role conflicts for institutional owners (Boatright, 1992; Katz and Kahn, 
1978; Schneider, 2000), which inhibit financial institutions from being as active as 
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they might otherwise be in corporate governance issues. Eaton (2002) argues that 
some financial institutions may be pressed by the government to invest in the local 
community, to support local businesses, and to create jobs, while also being one of its 
owners. Clearly, political pressure could restrain institutions’ tendency toward active 
monitoring of portfolio firms. 
One school of thought blames mistrust of powerful financial institutions for a 
number of laws and regulations that restrict institutional ownership of public 
corporations and discourage institutional monitoring of managers (Duggal and Millar, 
1999; Roe, 1990). For example, pension regulators may discourage pension managers 
from being appointed to the firms’ boards of directors fearing collusion between 
potentially unscrupulous fiduciary bodies and firm management. 
 
3.3  Prior studies about the role of financial institutions in China 
 The extant literature concludes that Chinese financial institutions are passive 
and transient investors. Tenev et al. (2002) argue that financial institutions in China 
have a small market presence and cannot play a stabilising role. As a result, corporate 
control mechanisms and shareholder activism can do little to mitigate agency 
problems under the existing highly concentrated and segmented ownership structure. 
Zhang (2002) holds the same opinion about the current role of financial institutions, 
and attributes their limited role to two main reasons, the small number and market 
capitalisation of Chinese financial institutions, and the immature legal system. 
According to Gen (2002), financial institutions would not play any role at all in 
corporate governance in listed companies because of the volatile securities market.  
Specifically, Tam (2002) points out that managed funds have not been able to play the 
anticipated role in lifting corporate performance nor instilling an element of stability 
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in the often volatile Chinese stock markets. However, no study has provided any 
empirical evidence to support these claims. 
 
4.  Research questions 
 This paper investigates the role that Chinese financial institutions  play in the 
governance of listed companies. On the one hand, financial institutions may be 
expected to act as shareholders and monitor corporate management on behalf of small 
shareholders and to take a long-term view of their shareholding positions, and, where 
necessary, incur expenses to discipline management. On the other hand, financial 
institutions must also act as investors with investment flexibility to maximise returns 
for their beneficiaries. In this respect, it is difficult to argue that institutions should 
continue to hold equity positions in inefficient companies and incur the additional 
expenses of intervening in management, particularly when there is no guarantee that 
intervention will be successful. Our question here is to identify which role Chinese 
financial institutions play, the role of shareholders, or the role of investors? To gain an 
understanding on this issue, it is necessary and important to identify the processes by 
which financial institutions monitor and influence listed companies, and the factors 
that facilitate or hinder the processes and effectiveness of financial institutions’ role in 
corporate governance. In particular, we address the following three questions:  
 First, what are the characteristics of firms that attract institutional investment?  
It can be argued that financial institutions’ partic ipation in the governance of listed 
companies starts when they perform quality research prior to investing. This process 
identifies efficient firms and directs scarce capital to its most efficient use.  It is 
therefore important to identify the characteristics of the firms that attract Chinese 
financial institutions and whether these include performance and governance issues. 
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Second, what are the expected and practical roles of financial institutions in 
corporate governance? Theoretically, financial institut ions are delegated monitors for 
their beneficial owners, and are expected to monitor their holdings closely and to take 
action to protect their value. However, Verstegen and Marguerite (2002) argue that a 
mix of financial, legal, and social influences affect financial institutions’ activism. As 
the institutional structures in transitional economies differ significantly from those 
familiar in developed countries (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng, 2003), there may exist a 
difference between the expected and the actual role of financial institutions in 
corporate governance. To explore their actual role in corporate governance, it is 
necessary to analyse the steps they take to influence the decision making of their 
investee companies. For example, when they are not satisfied with the ir portfolio 
companies, do they immediately sell their holdings or do they voice their 
dissatisfaction and intervene in corporate issues? The practice of managing their 
investment portfolio reflects their actual role in corporate governance.  
 Finally, what are the factors that affect the role of Chinese financial 
institutions in corporate governance? One cannot take it for granted that if financial 
institutions have the incentive to intervene in corporate governance affairs, they will 
be able to do so successfully. It is quite possible that various structural and regulatory 
barriers can impede this influence. These barriers can prevent them from fully 
exercising their power or may motivate them to exercise it in different directions. 
Exploring these factors can further demonstrate that shareholder activism is the result 
of a mix of financial, legal, and social influences. It can also help to provide 
recommendations so that financial institutions can play a greater role in corporate 
governance in the future. 
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5.  Research method  
Our research objective and questions require us to gain an insight into the 
contextual and procedural issues and underlying factors that affect the interactions 
between financial institutions and their portfolio companies. Interviews were 
considered as an appropriate method to fulfil our purpose to a degree unattainable 
through such research methods as statistical analysis and surveys of the existing 
literature. 
 We relied on our social contacts to obtain interviewees in financial institutions 
and listed companies. We interviewed twenty senior managers from financial 
institutions and ten directors of listed firms over the period from June to October 2004. 
The interviewees were drawn from the two main types of financial institutions, ten 
from fund management companies and ten from securities companies. The 
information about the twenty senior managers and their companies is listed in Table 1.  
To preserve anonymity, the names of interviewees and their companies are not 
disclosed. Instead, they are designated as, for instance, IM1 (i.e., Investment Manager 
One) and FM1 (i.e., Fund Manager One). All senior managers were well qualified 
academically and professionally, each holding a masters or doctoral degree in the 
areas of accounting, finance, statistics, or economics. Four of them had educational or 
work experience abroad. While all had at least five years’ work experience, 15 of 
them had more than five years’ work experience specifically in the financial industry.  
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Table 1: Interviewees from financial institutions and their companies 
 
Code Location 
Registered Capital (RMB 
yuan) Qualification Work experience  
IM1 Beijing 2.721 billion Doctor in finance 6 years 
IM2 Guangdong 3.450 billion  Master in finance  6 years 
IM3 Beijing 1.282 billion  Master in maths  5 years 
IM4 Beijing 1.005 billion  Doctor in accounting  9 years 
IM5 Shanghai 3.727 billion  Master in accounting 6 years 
IM6 Guangdong 2.015 billion  Master economics 10 years 
IM7 Beijing 1.048 billion  Master in economics 5 years 
IM8 Beijing 2.482 billion  Master in maths  8 years 
IM9 Beijing 1.510 billion  Doctor in economics 9 years 
IM10 Beijing 4.501 billion  Master in finance  5 years 
FM1 Shanghai 0.132 billion  Master in finance  7 years 
FM2 Shanghai 0.121 billion  Master in economics 8 years 
FM3 Beijing 0.152 billion  Doctor in finance  11 years 
FM4 Shanghai 0.117 billion  Doctor in economics 5 years 
FM5 Beijing 0.138 billion  Doctor in maths 7 years 
FM6 Beijing 0.124 billion  Master in accounting 10 years 
FM7 Shanghai 0.113 billion  Doctor in finance 5 years 
FM8 Beijing 0.125 billion  Master in maths 9 years 
FM9 Beijing 0.138 billion  Doctor in finance  9 years 
FM10 Beijing 0.150 billion  Master in finance  8 years 
 
Key: 
IM: Investment managers from securities companies; FM: Fund managers from fund management 
companies. RMB stands for Renminbi, i.e., people’s currency in Chinese. In the end of 2003, the 
exchange rate was about £1=RMB ¥ 15.8. Source: the official website of the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission http://www.csrc.gov.cn. 
 
 Listed companies whose representatives participated in the interviews were 
selected by the following selection criteria: 1) A firm should not be a financial 
company (e.g., banks, insurance companies, and investment trusts) as financial firms 
account and report under different rules from other listed companies; 2) A firm should 
have been listed at least one full year as of the end of 2003 in order to ensure that 
performance and capital structure are not significantly affected by a new listing that 
may confound the results; and 3) A firm should have securities companies and/or 
mutual funds as their top ten shareholders. Among the ten directors, nine were 
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executive directors and one independent director (BD9) who was a professor from a 
prestigious university. Most of them had a bachelor degree. The average tenure of 
board members is 1.55. The information about the ten directors and their companies is 
listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Interviewees from listed companies  
Code Location Industry Institution 
Qualification Board 
experience 
BD1 Beijing  
Other 
Manufacturing 5 F 
Bachelor in economics 
1.5 
BD2 Beijing  Transport  6 F Bachelor in politics 1 
BD3 Beijing  Social Services 1 F Doctor in management 1 
BD4* Sichuan  Beverage 1 S Master in accounting 2 
BD5* Guangdong  
Electrical 
Equipment  1 F 
Master in marketing 
2 
BD6* Liaoning  Medicine 7 F Bachelor in economics 2 
BD7 Shanghai  Gas, water supply 1 F Master in finance 2 
BD8* Hebei  Mining 4 F and 1S Bachelor in accounting 1 
BD9 Beijing  Medicine 2 S Doctor in accounting 2 
BD10* Xinjiang Metal 1 S Bachelor in management 1 
 
Key: BD: director of a listed company. *: from companies, whose head offices were in other provinces 
outside Beijing, but had established offices in Beijing. Institution: the number of financial institutions 
within the company’s top ten shareholders. S: Securities companies; F: Fund management companies. 
Board experience: The number of years served at board level. 
 
 A pilot study was carried out to test out the interview questions and to gain a 
feel about the interview process. Two pilot interviews assessed reactions to the initial 
questions, the amount of time that the interviews would take, and any need to amend 
questions before commencing the main study interviews. The assessment process 
included comparing the actual pilot interview with initial expectations, reviewing the 
research design and objectives, and seeking feedback from the pilot interviewees 
directly. One fund manager from a fund management company and one director from 
a listed company were chosen for the pilot.5 The pilot study led to some changes to 
                                                 
5 The two interviewees were not included in Tables 1 and 2. 
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the questions, for example, a clarification of the definition of financial institutions. 
Furthermore, the use of a tape recorder was ruled out because the pilot interviewees 
suggested that the prospective interviewees might object to being recorded, and using 
it would alter consciously or unconsciously their responses. Extensive notes were 
taken during the interviews and subsequently transcribed.  
In both the company and institutional cases, the interview questions (see 
Appendix) were semi-structured and designed to allow the interviewees to interpret 
and describe the phenomena in their own way. We contacted each interviewee in 
advance to secure participation and to provide them with the opportunities to consider 
the interview questions beforehand. Most interviews took place in the interviewees’ 
offices. The time for the interviews ranged from 60 to 90 minutes.  
A seven-stage approach (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991) was adopted to sift 
through and process the interview data. These stages were case familiarisation, 
reflection on contents, conceptualisation, cataloguing of concepts, recoding, linking, 
and re-evaluation. During these stages the interview responses of the various subjects 
were compared in order to identify common themes and problems which were 
compared to the researchers’ own priors and extant literature. The approach is 
iterative in that data and analysis are revisited on several occasions over an extended 
period of time. 
 
6.  Analysis and discussion of interview data 
6.1 Firm characteristics that attract institutional investment 
Before making an investment, financial institutions routinely perform quality 
research on listed companies to identify investment opportunities. Jing (2004) argues 
that because of different fund size and business structure, securities companies and 
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mutual funds exhibit different investment preferences. In addition to considering 
macroeconomic factors, most mutual funds had used a combination of governance 
issues and performance measures as their selection criteria, while most securities 
companies had targeted firms solely on performance.  
  All interviewees from financial institutions considered face-to-face meetings 
with managers of their portfolio companies as the most effective way to get 
information from the companies. As a result, the financial institutions’ representatives 
were very serious and cautious with each of such meetings. They would explain why 
the company was chosen and what action the institution would expect from the 
selected company by means of sending a formal letter, giving a formal phone call, or 
going out with company management. Generally, they met the CFO, the secretary to 
the board of directors (equivalent to company secretary in the UK), or managers from 
related departments. Information collection was focused in the areas of corporate 
financial performance, corporate strategy, and corporate growth opportunities.  
 Eighteen of the twenty interviewees from financial institutions employed on-
the-spot investigation to collect information that was probably not included in the 
documents and reports. In such an example, investment manager “IM8” found himself 
cheated by the corporate management when he inspected a reportedly new production 
line of the company and found that the line was already outdated. This information 
helped him discard the company from the investment portfolio. Further analysis in 
this subsection is based on questions 1 and 2 of Panel A in the Appendix. 
 
6.1.1 Good performance 
 All interviewees selected firms with good performance as their portfolio 
companies. In greater detail, they considered the need to maintain an upward trend in 
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the company’s earnings per share, a healthy cash flow and a reasonable level of 
gearing as key factors in their decision to invest. The results are not unexpected as 
profitability, cash flows and gearing are key indicators of a company’s financial 
standing. The explanation of fund manager “FM4” was typical:  
“As fund managers, we know that invested funds are essentially ‘other people’s money’ so we 
have a fiduciary duty to holders of tradable shares. A healthy cash flow and good profitability 
can ensure a high investment return, so that we can get a good return for our clients.”  
Investment manager “IM4” added another key point:  
“We need to be free to move funds around so that we can get the best return for the 
beneficiaries of our funds. The Chinese security market is very volatile  and unpredictable. We 
expect that companies with good performance will have good prospects. It is our job to invest 
the beneficiaries’ money in the most profitable investment. ” 
 
6.1.2 Tradable shareholdings 
 Di (2004) argues that tradability of shares is one of the factors that financial 
institutions consider when making investment decisions. Support for this comes from 
ten fund managers and two investment managers.  
 According to their views, as more shares are tradable, more voting rights are in 
the hands of trading shareholders and this leads to increased monitoring from 
individual investors and financial institutions. Accordingly, investee companies are 
under greater pressure to standardise their practice and improve their performance. As 
fund manager “FM5” said: 
“More tradable shareholdings indicate less state or legal person holdings in China. 
Consequently, less political pressure will intervene in the practice of companies. Thus, 
companies can operate to maximise the profit on behalf of the company and shareholders.”  
  However, it is important to notice that most investment managers had a 
different criterion to select portfolio companies. Eight of the ten investment managers 
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did not care much about tradable shareholdings in a company, because tradable 
ownership accounts for only about one third of all shares in the current ownership 
structure of listed companies. With such a low volume of shares, holders of tradable 
shares are still very weak, and their rights are always expropriated by controlling 
shareholders. 
 
6.1.3 Financial statements and annual report 
  Prior research indicates that investors rely on the information sent out from the 
company to make investment decisions (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Poitevin, 1990; Ravid 
and Sarig, 1991). In practice, companies with good operating performance often 
disclose information to the public to promote positive impressions of their company 
(Chiang, 2005), and the most tangible form of investor communication is the financial 
statements and annual report.  
 Twelve interviewees, including nine fund managers and three investment 
managers, considered that the quality of financial statements and annual report was 
clearly a key criterion for them to select portfolio companies. Of the twelve 
interviewees, eight also considered the disclosure of the company’s strategies and 
initiatives, and the quality of management’s discussion and analysis of the year’s 
results and financial position in the annual reports to be just as important. This 
indicates that firms with enhanced disclosures in their  annual reports beyond the basic 
mandatory requirements can attract institutional ownership.  
 Most interviewees considered the poor quality of information disclosure by 
listed companies as a fairly common problem. Investment manager “IM1” thought it 
was useless to consider the quality of information disclosure, as a significant number 
of listed companies only complied with the disclosure standards in form but not in 
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substance. Some did not even bother to comply with the form; they might make up 
their financial statements by manipulating accruals. Fund manager “FM1” said: 
“One of the most important reasons why we had so many financial scandals recently is the 
current poor quality of financial statements and annual reports of listed companies. This 
implies that any further legislative changes should not ignore this point while seeking to 
prevent recurrence of the highly publicised cases of fraud, error, and crime in the corporate 
governance process.” 
 
6.1.4 Quality of management 
 Holland (1998) identifies the ‘quality of management’ as one of the most 
important ingredients in expected corporate financial performance. Management was 
the medium to change other factors such as strategy, innovation, the quality of 
financial reports and the functioning of board committees. In a similar vein, twelve 
interviewees, including eight fund managers and four investment managers, held the 
same opinion.  
 Chinese corporate managers do not suffer the pressure from external 
governance mechanisms such as the market for corporate control and managerial 
labour market (Chiou and Lin, 2005). Most shares in China cannot be traded freely 
and thus corporate managers do not have to worry about poor management that may 
cause their enterprise’s stock price to fall, or that their company will be faced with a 
take over threat as the market for corporate control is absent in China, and the 
managerial labour market is still immature. Instead, being fired by the board of 
directors seems to be a more serious threat to managers than an outside takeover (Bai 
et al., 2004). Moreover, other studies have found evidence that the decision-making 
duty of the board of directors cannot really be separated from the managers’ duty of 
implementing the decisions (Chen and Huang, 2001). Also, there is serious overlap 
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between board members and managers as executive board members are dominant in 
the boardroom. Therefore, the quality of Chinese corporate management is of great 
importance for investors to consider. Meetings were seen as a key opportunity to 
collect data on the quality of the management team and their attitudes and managerial 
skills (Holland, 1998). This approach was also used by twelve of our interviewees to 
gather information about the company and its management.  
Investment manager “IM7” was not satisfied with the current quality of the 
management in some listed companies. He said: 
“When companies come to the market to raise additional equity funds, the onus is on 
management to negotiate with the institutional shareholders. But in practice, it was always the 
management of listed companies that were reluctant to exchange their ideas and ignored us. 
Sometimes we were forced to take collective actions against their corporate proposals.” 
 
6.1.5 Investor communications 
 Seven fund managers valued the willingness of companies to provide 
additional information to investors, analysts and other commentators, their prompt 
release of information about transactions affecting minority shareholders and the 
existence of other transparency mechanisms that help ensure fair treatment of all 
shareholders. Fund manager “FM10,” by contrast, was disappointed with the investor 
relations departments in most listed companies, as they did not always do what they 
were saying. 
 
6.2 The role of financial institutions in corporate governance 
After investment, financial institutions kept close touch with their portfolio 
companies and paid a great deal of attention to each change of stock prices to 
safeguard their investment. The objective expressed by the majority of the financial 
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institutions was to contribute to their long-term investment performance.  However, 
because of barriers to effective governance, our interview data, based on Questions 3, 
4 and 6 of Panel A, and Questions 1, 2 and 3 of Panel B in the Appendix, show that 
the majority of financial institutions are still passive shareholders.  
 
6.2.1 The expected role of financial institutions  
When asked what kind of role Chinese financial institutions should play in the 
governance of listed companies, eighteen managers from financial institutions and 
eight directors of listed companies asserted that the financial institutions should 
monitor and check controlling shareholders and corporate management to protect the 
rights of minority shareho lders, to improve firm performance and to enhance the value 
of shareholders. This is well encapsulated by the remarks of director “BD6” and fund 
manager “FM2”: 
“Financial institutions should bring their potential into play. For example, since they are 
professional investors, they should make suggestions and help us to make scientific decisions 
when we seeking advice or when rais ing funds. Also, they should prevent large shareholders 
from carving out assets of listed companies and should check collusion between controlling 
shareholders and other large shareholders.” (Director “BD6”) 
 
“We have realised that we (financial institutions) cannot rely on traditional mechanisms to 
safeguard our investments. Instead, we have a responsibility to make considered use of our 
votes . Accordingly, we should encourage the firm to change its policy when we feel one of our 
portfolio companies is poorly managed. Recent attempts by some active mutual funds to exert 
corporate control indicate that our behaviour is changing.” (Fund manager “FM2”) 
  The other interviewees did not think that financial institutions should play a 
role in the governance of listed companies. In their opinion, financial institutions are 
only professional investors, and have neither the skills nor the experience to improve 
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on managers’ decisions. Therefore, their attempts to influence corporate decisions 
tend to disrupt the firm’s operations. Furthermore, their myopic focus on short-term 
earnings would deter the firm’s long-term financial health. 
 
6.2.2  The actual role of financial institutions in China    
6.2.2.1 Active shareholders    
 Some mutual funds reportedly exercised their monitoring role in corporate 
governance. Five mutual funds managers “FM2,” “FM3,” FM5,” “FM8,” and “FM9” 
claimed that they were becoming active shareholders (or quasi-active monitors, more 
precisely). They helped listed companies to raise funds, to standardise their practices, 
and to establish good images in the secondary capital market by means of constructive 
communication with corporate management and by exercising their voting rights at 
shareholders’ meetings. In particular, they went so far as to intervene in corporate 
issues (1) when the financing arrangements violated the company constitutions, or (2) 
when investment decisions were inconsistent with the proposal, or (3) when the 
financing arrangements violated the rights of minority shareholders. 
 According to fund managers “FM2” and “FM8,” the main purpose of some 
mutual funds interfering into corporate affairs is to improve the governance of listed 
companies, as they believed that such changes would eventually improve firm 
performance. The following remarks by director “BD2” echoed these views of the 
fund managers: 
    “In many cases mutual funds helped us make financial forecasts, pushed us to provide 
voluntary disclosures, and standardised our operations. Occasionally, they made suggestions 
and attempted to veto some of our proposals that would affect the rights of minority 
shareholders in general shareholders’ meetings. To a certain degree, their behaviour pushed us 
to improve corporate governance practices and firm performance as well.”  
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 Directors “BD4” and “BD7” also agreed that mutual funds’ intervention in 
corporate issues had improved the performance and governance of their companies. 
For example, mutual funds influenced their attitudes towards increasing shareholder 
benefits, suggested cost-cutting that boosted profits, and pushed them to improve the 
quality of financial disclosure. 
Active mutual funds generally begin with constructive, but frank, 
communications with corporate management about firm performance and strategy. 
They discussed with the secretary to the board of directors, sometimes with the 
company chairman, general managers or managers from functional departments. They 
explained why they might not be satisfied and what action they desired from the 
portfolio companies. However, when a constructive dialogue fails, mutual funds 
might voice their dissatisfaction to the public either independently or in conjunction 
with other institutional shareholders, because taking such steps is considered to be 
consistent with small shareholders’ best interests.  
 In terms of voting, they usually supported the voting recommendation of a 
company’s board. In the event of voting against a proposal, they always informed the 
company beforehand and explained the reasons for so doing. They used reasonable 
endeavours to seek responses from the company to address the underlying concern 
before they actually put their cross in the box.  
 When portfolio companies asked for funds, help or advice; or when they faced 
unusual circumstances, mutual funds increased their pressure and exercised their 
influence via the board and senior management on problematic aspects of strategy, 
management quality, and financial reporting, in the expectation that this would 
contribute to improved financial performance. When the influence process failed, the 
mutual funds resorted to complete sales of stock. 
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 The five fund managers pointed out that the areas they would like to intervene 
in include influencing attitudes towards increasing shareholder benefits, boosting 
profits, cutting costs, and especially improving the quality of corporate disclosure, an 
area where they have expertise and their intervention costs are low. They were very 
careful only to attempt to influence a firm on matters of the principle in the Code of 
Corporate Governance (CSRC, 2001), such as the separation of chairman and CEO 
roles. In their opinion, influencing corporate strategy was not part of their competence 
and, besides, it created serious conflicts with portfolio companies. They attempt to do 
so only in exceptional cases when such corporate strategies seriously harm minority 
shareholders. 
 Fund manager “FM9” noted that mutual funds employed very few methods 
effectively to monitor corporate management. They seldom initiated litigation against 
companies, although they are the common ways of institutional intervention in the 
market economies, especially in the US and UK (Wahal, 1996).  
However, these mutual funds were active monitors, not activists. “We talk to 
the management, and if things are not going the way they should be going, we can 
make suggestions,” Fund manager “FM3” explained, “but we are not activists in the 
sense of trying to ge t involved in management to enforce those issues.” He expressed 
his dissatisfaction to the public when China Merchants Bank (CMB) proposed to issue 
10 billion convertible bonds in September 2003 without any communication with its 
financial institutions beforehand, as this proposal would expropriate the rights of 
minority shareholders. More than forty mutual funds, including “FM2,” “FM3,” 
“FM5,” “FM8,” and “FM9,” took an unprecedented collective action to vote against 
this proposal. During the interview “FM3” added with excitement, “From the recent 
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cases that challenged corporate managements, we seem to hear the bugle call for 
institutional activism.” Furthermore, fund manager “FM9” expressed his confidence: 
“Though we eventually achieved a very limited amount of success [in the CMB case], the fight 
has just started and will become much fiercer, from a long term perspective. We believe that 
we would win in the end, as we are becoming stronger in the capital market, looking for our 
own stage, and getting our voice heard.” 
  According to directors “BD2,” “BD5” and “BD8”, some mutual funds really 
participated in improving the governance of listed companies, but there was much 
room for them to improve the effectiveness of participation. All fund managers and 
six investment managers suggested that efforts were needed to promote international 
exchanges, to organise training and consulting, to provide better education, and to 
realise global sharing of related experience and resources. 
 
6.2.2.2 Passive investors  
 Drucker (1976, p. 82) states that “pension funds are not ‘owners’, they are 
investors. They do not want control …The pension funds are trustees. It is their job to 
invest the beneficiaries’ money in the most profitable investment. They have no 
business trying to ‘manage’. If they do not like a company or management, their duty 
is to sell the stock.” Supporting this quotation, there is much anecdotal evidence to 
suggest that institutional shareholders do not even adopt a monitoring role, preferring 
to sell their holdings in “problem” companies rather than intervening in the 
management of that company (Short and Keasey, 1997). This is also the case with the 
majority of Chinese financial institutions.  
 All investment managers from securities companies and the remaining fund 
managers (excluding those in the five active funds mentioned above) admitted that 
they were just passive investors and did not take much interest in the governance of 
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their portfolio companies. They tried to achieve the best return for their clients by 
buying and selling shares in a short period of time, relying on their judgement of the 
underlying strength of companies and their ability to exploit share price anomalies. 
Generally, these financial institutions seldom attended shareholders’ meetings. They 
had almost no communications with the  corporate management of their portfolio 
companies. They tolerated the problems in corporate governance as long as profits 
remained acceptable, and preferred to take the “Wall Street Rule”; i.e., to sell when 
faced with serious problems.  
 Investment manager “IM8” said, “We have little interest in monitoring the 
management, showing up at shareholders’ meetings and taking an active role in the 
company. What we are interested in is a better return from the share price gap.”  
However, as fund manager “FM2” explained, only in extreme cases, for example, 
when their interests were seriously damaged, did some financial institutions have to 
fight. 
 In summary, the majority of financial institutions were passive investors 
although a good proportion of mutual funds claimed that they were becoming active 
monitors. Thus, there is a gap between this actual role and the role that the majority 
interviewees’ expected financial institutions to play. This general passivity warrants a 
detailed examination of the underlying reasons, which is undertaken below.  
 
6.3 Factors that influence the role of financial institutions in corporate 
governance 
Our interviews identify three groups of interrelated factors that hinder the role 
of financial institutions in corporate governance: environmental, supply side (financial 
institutions), and demand side (listed firms).   
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6.3.1  Environmental factors  
The first environmental factor that all interviewees agreed is the problematic 
ownership structure. The low level of shareholdings held by financial institutions 
prevents them from monitoring corporate management. Compared with state and legal 
person shareholders, financial institutions are minority shareholders, and the voting 
powers are not large enough for corporate control. “We are so weak that it was useless 
to put forward our proposals or express our concern.” Investment manager “IM9” 
explained, “As far as I know, few suggestions were accepted in shareholders’ 
meetings. Since we all know the result of our effort, why do we work in vain?” 
Investment manger “FM6” concurred: “Though we would like to intervene, it is very 
obvious that our interference does not produce any effect, as we have a very small 
size of shareholdings.” The thought of director “BD3” was typical: 
 “Most listed companies have excessive concentration of non-tradable shares, and overly 
dispersed holders of tradable shares are in an inferior position relative to controlling 
shareholders. The interests of minority shareholders and other stakeholders are not always 
respected and protected. The situation makes the voice of financial institutions irrelevant.” 
The above remark by director “BD3”alluded to the second environmental factor: 
China’s weak regulatory environment (Pistor and Xu, 2005). Zhang (2002) argues that 
because of the imperfect legal and supervisory environment, Chinese financial 
institutions are just traders, and prefer short-term investments.  One particular 
weakness of the current legal system that was pointed out by many interviewees is the 
poor legal protection of minority shareholders. “Although we are large holders of 
tradable shares, we are also the minority.” Investment manager “IM5” said, “Since it 
is the common fact that our concern is always ignored by listed companies, we are not 
willing to incur expenses in intervening in listed companies’ governance issues.” 
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Director “BD1” echoed,  
“It is true that we always neglected the voice of financial institutions. Major strategic decisions 
were mostly agreed upon beforehand among the key shareholders, typically the state, often 
outside the boardroom. We are usually the representatives of the largest shareholder who 
indirectly exerts control over shareholders’ meetings.” 
 Third, there may be a Chinese cultural aversion to resorting to litigation that is 
regarded as confrontational and aggressive. Procter (1998) notes that financial 
institutions tend not to become involved in corporate governance issues affecting their 
investments. There is a genuine reluctance to litigate issues. Investment manager 
“IM3” pointed out that minority shareholders tend to accept the convention that they 
are often not fellow stakeholders with equal rights and interests and not to “interfere” 
into the company’s “internal affairs”. This cultural factor may influence financial 
institutions’ role in corporate governance. 
 
6.3.2  Supply side factors  
Agency problems within financial institutions were considered to prevent them 
from being active shareholders. Directors “BD3” and “BD9” argued that financial 
institutions might be imperfect monitors due to their own internal agency problems. 
Director “BD1” explained:  
“Financial companies, especially securities companies, have not established sound corporate 
governance systems and there is insufficient checks and balances among the board of directors, 
shareholders, the supervisory board and the management. Currently many financial institutions 
suffer the same problems as our listed companies. The weak corporate governance within 
financial institutions necessarily affects their role in the governance of portfolio companies.” 
Moreover, institutional owners are agents themselves with their own goals, 
separate from the goals of their clients. Due to information asymmetry, such agency 
problems as collusion and share-price manipulation arise when institutional owners 
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find it mutually advantageous to co-operate with corporate management on certain 
issues. Their current or potential business relationships with the firm make them less 
willing to curb management discretion actively.   
Another supply side factor relates to financial institutions’ lack of expertise to 
improve managerial decisions (Taylor, 1990; Wohlstetter, 1993). As investment 
manager “IM4” argued, financial institutions are undoubtedly skilled investors but 
lack expertise in corporate governance, and activism would detract from their primary 
role, which is managing money for their clients. He also questioned the incentives for 
some active mutual funds to undertake activism. According to his view, the attempts 
to intervene in corporate issues might be motivated more by social influence than by 
firm performance.  
In addition, investment manager “IM10” argued that, due to the recent 
recession of the securities industry in China, securities companies had no incentive 
and no power to participate in the governance of listed companies. “We are like clay 
idols fording a river—hardly able to save ourselves,” “IM5” said, “let alone anyone 
else.” 
 Fourth, being a shareholder and a current or potential business service 
provider creates goal conflicts (David and Kochhar, 1996). Such goal conflicts also 
reduce Chinese financial institutions’ willingness to put pressure on company 
management in the event of corporate governance deficiencies. Investment manager 
“IM5” told of his dilemma which might change the proclivity towards intervention. In 
addition to holding equity in a listed company, his securities company also provided 
financial services to that company. Accordingly, he had to safeguard his company’s 
investment and maintain a business relationship with the investee company. The dual 
roles of these activities may pose for him a conflict of interest. Furthermore, in fear of 
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retaliation, he might be compelled to vote with the management even though contrary 
to his fiduciary duty.  
Furthermore, according to investment manager “IM6”, the costs of monitoring 
and checking corporate management can lead to passivity. As is the case in the UK 
(Webb et al., 2003), the costs are prohibitive in China compared to the stake that a 
financial institution has in the company.  
 
6.3.3  Demand side factors  
Two demand side factors emerged from our interview data:  inadequate 
transparency and disclosure and poor investor relations. It is widely believed that false 
accounting and financial misreporting are pervasive among Chinese companies. 
Hence, the lack of true, accurate and complete information required to analyse 
portfolio companies become a barrier to effective governance. Investment manager 
“IM2” and fund manager “FM7” attributed the poor disclosure to the lack of effective 
legal punishment for reporting companies, weak competition in the capital market, 
and inadequate internal control systems for disclosure within the companies.  
 Relating to disclosure is the issue of investor relations. Listed Chinese 
companies have only recently begun to establish an “Investor Relations Department”. 
Director “BD5” who was also the secretary to the board of directors and the director 
of the investor relations department in his company, revealed that in practice it was 
difficult to carry out the function of this department. For example, whether companies 
could provide additional information to investors, such as information about 
transactions affecting minority shareholders, was up to the willingness of controlling 
shareholders.  However, all directors in our sample considered an investor relations 
function as an important means to ensure effective communication between managers 
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and investors. Directors “BD7” and “BD10” admitted that until recently it had been 
very difficult to communicate, but now there is more cooperation with financial 
institutions.  
All interviewees from financial institutions also viewed an investor relations 
department as important as it provides a convenient and natural media for financial 
institutions to monitor and influence firm performance and accountability. They 
acknowledged that the establishment of an investor relations management function 
had improved their communications with their portfolio companies.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 This study has investigated the expected and actual roles of financial 
institutions in corporate governance and the factors that affect their role. The majority 
of our interviewees expected financial institutions to play an active monitoring or 
interventionist role in corporate governance while a minority of our interviewees 
argued that they should remain passive investors.   
Our interviews show two phases at which financial institutions could affect 
corporate governance. Prior to making an investment, financia l institutions performed 
quality research in order to identify efficient firms, thus directing scarce capital to its 
most efficient use and consequently enhancing corporate efficiency. Indeed, most 
fund managers considered firm performance, tradable shareholdings, financial 
statements and annual report, quality of management, and investor communications as 
important factors that affect institutional investment decisions.  
The interview data also indicate that five mutual funds seemed to be active 
monitors and exercised their influence on corporate management and that some 
directors confirmed the positive effect of financial institutions’ participation in 
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corporate governance.  By contrast, the other mutual funds and all securities 
companies in our sample appeared to be passive shareholders and did not play any 
role in the governance of listed companies. Overall, there appears to be an 
expectations gap between the actual role and the expected role.   
  The interview data also suggest that a number of factors account for this 
limited role played by financial institutions. These are the high concentration of state 
ownership, the immature regulatory environment, the inadequate disclosure of 
financial information, the weak corporate governance within financial institutions 
themselves, conflicts of interest with investee companies, high monitoring costs, and 
lack of expertise. The most important determinant is the high degree of state 
ownership concentration. This causes severe insider control and pursuance of non-
economic objectives in listed companies, which limits the role of financial institutions 
in corporate governance (Zhou, 2004). The next three determinants listed above are 
specific to the Chinese context while the remaining factors have also been found to 
influence shareholder activism in developed economies (e.g., Roe, 1990; David and 
Kochhar, 1996).  
 This study makes several contributions. It is the first study to provide 
interview-based empirical evidence on the role of financial institutions in the 
governance of listed Chinese firms. This evidence suggests that the prior perception 
that they do not play any role should be modified.  Second, we are able to show that 
securities companies and mutual funds could play differing roles in corporate 
governance in China.  Third, we have identified a set of determinants of the role of 
financial institutions in corporate governance that are specific to the Chinese context.  
In addition, the findings have a number of policy implications. First, they 
suggest that the regulatory efforts in promoting the development of mutual funds 
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seem to have generated positive, albeit limited, impacts on corporate governance. 
Second, the governance, monitoring and incentive mechanisms for financial 
institutions themselves need be perfected.  Third, there is a need to improve legal 
protection of minority investors including financial institutions. Moreover, there is a 
need to nurture a culture of trust and ethics in both financial institutions and their 
portfolio firms to prevent insider trading, collusion, and false reporting. Finally, 
improved investor relations may help to enhance the role of financial institutions in 
corporate governance.  
Further research is needed to identify the reasons why various financial 
institutions in China play differing roles in corporate governance. It would also be 
useful to provide empirical tests of whether mutual funds’ positive role actually 
improves the performance of their portfolio firms. Finally, in-depth case studies 
would help uncover more detailed procedural aspects as to how mutual funds actually 
engage in corporate governance.    
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Appendix: Interview schedule 
Panel A: Questions to financial institutions : 
 
1. What factors do you consider in deciding on an investment in a company? 
2. How do you communicate with your portfolio companies before investment? 
(1) How often, by what means and with whom do you contact with your 
target before investment? 
(2) What topics are generally covered during the communication before 
investment? 
(3) What benefits do you get from the communication? 
3. How do you communicate with portfolio companies after investment? 
(1) How often, by what means and with whom do you contact with your 
target(s) after investment? 
(2) What topics are generally covered during the communication after 
investment? 
(3) How is attendance at shareholder meetings and voting? (Have you sat 
on the board of directors or supervisory board of your portfolio 
companies?) 
4. What role do you expect financial institutions to play in the governance of 
listed companies? 
5. What factors affect your intervention in the governance of listed companies?  
6. What role do you play in governance of your portfolio firms?  
7. What is your opinion about the investor relations management in your 
portfolio firms? 
 
Panel B: Questions to listed companies 
1. What roles does your financial institution(s) play in the governance of your 
companies? 
2. What does your company do if the financial institution wants to communicate 
with you about corporate governance? 
3. How does your company deal with a financial institution’s demand for 
change? 
4. What is your opinion about your company’s investor relations management? 
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